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TRACING ROADS OF NOSTALGIA
CAN THERE BE A SHARED *LIEU DE MÉMOIRE* FOR THE GREEK AND TURKISH REFUGEES OF THE POPULATION EXCHANGE OF THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION (1923)?
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ΑΝΙΧΝΕΥΟΝΤΑΣ ΔΡΟΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΟΣΤΑΛΓΙΑΣ
ΜΠΟΡΕΙ ΝΑ ΥΠΑΡΞΕΙ ΕΝΑΣ ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΤΟΠΟΣ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΛΛΑΓΗΣ ΠΛΗΘΥΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΛΟΖΑΝΗΣ (1923);

Angelos Palikidis / Άγγελος Παληκίδης[*]

ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Η Σύμβαση της Λοζάνης, η οποία υπογράφτηκε μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας στις 30 Ιανουαρίου 1923, επέβαλε την υποχρεωτική ανταλλαγή πληθυσμών μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας. Με ελάχιστες εξαιρέσεις, σχεδόν δύο εκατομμύρια άνθρωποι αναγκάστηκαν να εγκαταλείψουν τις πατρίδες τους και να μεταναστεύσουν στην άλλη χώρα. Για πολλές δεκαετίες οι άνθρωποι αυτοί απαγορευόταν να ταξιδεύουν στην ιδιαίτερη πατρίδα τους και να επισκέπτονται τα μέρη στα οποία γεννήθηκαν και έζησαν, ενώ αντιμετωπίζονταν εχθρικά και στη νέα τους πατρίδα. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η εκπαίδευση λειτουργούσε ως παράγοντας εθνικής πολιτισμικής ομογενοποίησης, με σκοπό να

[*]**Angelos Palikidis** is Assistant Professor in History Didactics at the Department of History and Ethnology of the Democritus University of Thrace. apalikid@he.duth.gr

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διασφαλίσει ότι οι επόμενες γενιές των προσφυγικών οικογενειών θα λησμονούσαν την καταγωγή τους και θα αποκήρυτταν την πολιτισμική τους κληρονομιά. Τυπική επιλογή, άλλωστε, της πολιτιστικής και εκπαιδευτικής πολιτικής των εθνικών κρατών υπήρξε η εξάλειψη κάθε στοιχείου που ενδεχομένως θα αμφισβητούσε το κυρίαρχο εθνικό αφήγημα, αναδεικνύοντας κοινά χαρακτηριστικά και εμπειρίες των δυο λαών. Δεν πρέπει να ξεχνάμε ότι το χάσμα και η εχθρότητα που συντηρούνταν και στις δυο πλευρές εδραζόταν όχι μόνο στη μακρά ιστορική ακολουθία των μεταξύ τους πολέμων, αλλά και σε βαθιά εμπεδωμένες στερεοτυπικές εικόνες, οι οποίες δαιμονοποιούσαν τον άλλο φυλετικά και πολιτισμικά, αποκλείοντας κάθε πιθανότητα συμφιλίωσης. Σε αυτό το ασφυκτικό προπαγανδιστικό πλαίσιο, οι πρόσφυγες ήταν οι μόνοι που είχαν ζήσει στην άλλη όχθη, έφεραν μνήμες ειρηνικής συνύπαρξης και, επομένως, μπορούσαν να θέσουν υπό αμφισβήτηση την αποκρουστική εικόνα του εχθρού. Ωστόσο, παρά τις ομοιότητες στη στάση των δυο κρατών απέναντι στους νέους τους υπηκόους και στην προσφυγική μνήμη, η δραστηριοποίηση των προσφύγων φαίνεται ότι δεν υπήρξε ίδια στις δυο χώρες. Στην Ελλάδα, για πολλούς λόγους, οι πρόσφυγες πολύ γρήγορα οργανώθηκαν σε πολιτιστικούς συλλόγους, απέκτησαν πολιτική εκπροσώπηση, συνέστησαν ιδρύματα και μουσεία και δημιούργησαν αρχεία για τη διάσωση της μνήμης των χαμένων πατρίδων τους. Στην Τουρκία, από την άλλη πλευρά, οι πρόσφυγες μόλις λίγο πριν το 2000 αρχίζουν να δραστηριοποιούνται συλλογικά. Ο πιο δραστήριος φορέας σήμερα στην Τουρκία είναι η Μη Κυβερνητική Οργάνωση «Ίδρυμα Ανταλλαγέντων της Λοζάνης». Το Ίδρυμα πραγματοποιεί πολιτιστικές εκδηλώσεις και εκθέσεις στην Τουρκία και στην Ελλάδα, συγκεντρώνει προφορικές μαρτυρίες, οργανώνει ταξίδια στους τόπους προέλευσης των Τούρκων προσφύγων στην Ελλάδα, ενώ έχει αναπτύξει και αξιόλογη εκδοτική δραστηριότητα. Σκοπός της παρούσας εργασίας είναι να τοποθετήσει μέσα στην ίδια κορνίζα τις ελληνικές και τουρκικές μνημονικές κοινότητες των προσφύγων της Σύμβασης της Λοζάνης. Στο πρώτο μέρος γίνεται σύντομη αναφορά στο ιστορικό πλαίσιο της ανταλλαγής πληθυσμών, στην πολιτική διαχείρισή του και στη θέση που πήρε στις δυο εθνικές ιστοριογραφίες. Στο δεύτερο μέρος γίνεται επισκόπηση της ιστορίας των προσφυγικών συλλόγων και των δύο χωρών. Στο τρίτο μέρος αναδεικνύονται οι αποκλίσεις και, κυρίως, οι συγκλίσεις που προκύπτουν από την ανάλυση των αφηγήσεων των Ελλήνων και Τούρκων προσφύγων, όπως αυτές καταγράφονται στη δίγλωσση έκδοση του Ιδρύματος Ανταλλαγέντων, και επιχειρείται μια προσέγγιση του προσφυγικού τραύματος και της διαγενεακής του εξέλιξης. Στο τέταρτο μέρος αναπτύσσεται προβληματισμός ως προς το εάν είναι εφικτή η δημιουργία ενός κοινού τόπου μνήμης για τους πρόσφυγες και των δυο πλευρών και ποια θα έπρεπε να είναι τα χαρακτηριστικά του.

Ο **Άγγελος Παληκίδης** είναι Επίκουρος Καθηγητής Διδακτικής της Ιστορίας στο Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Εθνολογίας του Δημοκρίτειου Πανεπιστημίου Θράκης. apalikid@he.duth.gr

ABSTRACT

The Lausanne Convention, signed by the Greek and Turkish governments on 30 January 1923, after the defeat of the Greek army at the Asia Minor front in 1922, imposed the compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations. With a few exceptions, almost two million people were forced to leave their homeland and migrate to the other country. For many decades, these people were forbidden to travel to their homeland and visit the places where their families had lived for centuries, while in their new homeland they were treated with hostility. Within this context, education operated as a factor of cultural homogenization, which would ensure that the future generations of refugee families would forget their past and conceal their cultural heritage. Moreover, a typical choice made by the cultural and educational policies of the two relevant nation-states was the elimination of any element that could possibly undermine the dominant national narrative by demonstrating common characteristics and experiences of the two peoples. We should not forget that the division and enmity that were maintained by both sides were based on not only the long historical sequence of wars, but also on the deeply embedded stereotypical images, which racially and culturally demonized the other, thus excluding any possibility of reconciliation. Within this asphyxiating propagandistic environment, the refugees were the only ones who had lived on the other side, preserving memories of peaceful coexistence and who, therefore, could question the image of the detested other. Even so, despite the similarities in the attitudes of the two states towards their new citizens and their refugee memory, it does not appear that the refugees were as equally active in both countries. In Greece, for many reasons, the refugees quickly organized themselves into cultural associations, achieved political representation, established institutions and museums, and created archives of written and visual documents and oral testimonies. In Turkey, on the other hand, the descendants of refugees only started to be active collectively a little before 2000. Today, the most active foundation in Turkey is the NGO *Lozan Mübadilleri Vakfi*. The foundation holds cultural events and exhibitions in Turkey and Greece, collects oral testimonies and organizes trips to the places of origin of Turkish refugees in Greece. Furthermore, it has developed a remarkable publishing activity. This paper aims to place the Greek and Turkish memory communities of the refugees of the Lausanne Convention within the same framework of observation. In the first part, a brief outline of the historical context of the population exchange is given, how it was handled politically and the position it took in the two national historiographies. The second part reviews the history of refugee associations and foundations in both countries. The third part shows the differences and, mostly, similarities that arise from an analysis of the narratives of Greek and Turkish refugees,

as these appear in the bilingual publication of the *Lozan Mübadilleri Vakfi*. An attempt is also made to interpret refugee trauma and its intergenerational evolution. In the fourth part, some thoughts are given on the question of whether it is possible to create a common *lieu de mémoire* for the refugees on both sides, and what its characteristics should be.

Emerging from the 'longue durée' of multiethnicity on history's turbulent surface

The Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey and the Lausanne Convention that imposed it were the unavoidable consequence of a watershed event for the dominant historiography and collective consciousness of both nations, Greek and Turkish. In the sphere of public history in Greece, this historic event is known as the "Asia Minor Catastrophe", or with the metonymy "1922", while in Turkey this event is related to the "National War of Independence" and the revolutionary foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

For the Greek side, the main event was not only the violent expatriation of approximately 1,300,000 people, but the destruction of the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) as well. It was the national ideology that until then had defined, in multiple ways, the direction taken by the Greek state and which linked national unification with irredentism and the incorporation into the national body of those regions in which Greek-Orthodox populations lived. In other words, "1922" was inscribed into contemporary Greek history as a national trauma and the uprooting of the Greek populations of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace as collateral damage, a burden that Greece was obliged to bear as a result of its defeat. At the same time, however, 1922 also signified a breakthrough — the beginning of a new era in national history. The amassing and development of the forces of Hellenism within the national borders, the definitive settlement of the political map of the Balkans and the national and religious homogenization of the population were presented as the positive consequences of a painful defeat. The refugees were quickly integrated into the corpus of the national narrative and presented as martyrs of the barbarity of the "other". Even in Greek school history textbooks, the "Greek catastrophe" and the tragedy of migration took its place in the timeline of the history of the nation from as early as 1925 (Theodoridis & Lazarou 1925: 576-577). From that time, the question of the war and the refugees was often to be found at the centre of political and scholarly discourse and debate.

For the most part, the drama of the refugees was used to attribute political and military blame for the defeat — something that was directly related to the continuing (from 1916) "national schism" within Greek politics into Venizelists/Liberals and anti-Venizelists/Royalists, a schism with which the refugees became involved right from the start, given that they had been granted political rights immediately and supported Eleftherios Venizelos en masse. The refugee vote played a decisive role in the referendum on the abolition of the monarchy in 1924 and in the elections of 1926 and 1928, which the Liberal Party won with a large majority, as it also did in Venizelos' defeat in the 1932 elections, after the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1930.

For Turkey, on the other hand, “1922” signifies the successful conclusion of the “National War of Independence” and the beginning of the creation of a “New Turkey”, a homogeneous nation-state. For Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey, this also meant de-Ottomanization, an exit from medieval multi-ethnicity and a definitive transition to the modernity of the nation-state. In Turkey, in contrast with Greece, up until at least the 1990s, the Population Exchange and the hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees from “Rumelia” were not at the centre of public discourse, nor did they attract the interest of historians. The master narrative of national history was dominated by the victorious campaign to reclaim Turkish territory from the foreign conquerors and the diplomatic victories of the Turkish political leadership at Lausanne. While, as Onur Yildirim remarks, for Greek historians the Population Exchange was “a turning point in the consolidation of the country’s ethnic and national homogeneity”, in Turkish historiography it was reduced to “hardly more than a footnote” (2006: 46). Only very recently has a critical and revisionist trend emerged among Turkish historians, broadening the chronology and subject matter of the field of study (Ozil 2011; Hirschon 2009: 90).

The populations that were excluded from the Exchange, that is, the Greek-Orthodox inhabitants of Constantinople, Imvros and Tenedos, on the one hand, and the Muslims of Western Thrace, on the other, were derogated to the status of second-class citizens (Tsitselikis 2014: 212) — the remnants of another era. They were marginalized and targeted by the press, governments and nationalists during periods of tension in Greek-Turkish relations. Worst of all, they were identified with the “ethnic other” and treated as the “enemy from within” (Yildirim 2002: 322). The term “minority” that was officially adopted is an eloquent example of the way in which they were seen in the two countries as the “remaining” ethnic communities, and of their position within the prevailing “pure” post-war national communities. The fact that they were treated as foreigners by these communities can be seen in the recognition of the right of one country to “protect” the minority population in the other, as though they were a silent extension of the boundaries of its national jurisdiction (Oran 2006).

I will not elaborate here on the trends that emerged in Greek and Turkish ethnocentric historiography over the Population Exchange, their importance for the contemporary history of the two countries and their impact on the relations between the two countries.[1] Despite the competitiveness and rivalry of the national narratives, I will simply note that the rhetoric of victimization, the triumph or the drama, the overemphasis or concealment as well as the political goals that the two sides display are essentially comparable: the building of ethnically homogeneous nations, the achievement of un-mixed peoples and, as a result, the construction of a national historical consciousness in which multiethnic and multicultural coexistence is inconceivable —a threat to peace and the progress of the nation. For this reason, both

the Turkish-speaking Christian populations of Cappadocia and the Greek-speaking Muslim populations of Crete, Macedonia and Ioannina were seen almost as enemies by the local populations and state services. For example, the "Romioi" (the Greek-Orthodox Christians, "Rum" in Turkish) of Asia Minor were condemned in public discourse and Ottoman-Turkish historiography as a traitorous population that collaborated with the enemy, that is, the Greeks — something that is disproved by recent research (Ozil 2011: 121-122).

The reasons for such enmity towards the refugees were not only political and economic. The refugees were bearers of a cultural diversity that was incompatible with the one-dimensional model of the citizen in both countries. The main problem was that the refugees had lived as members of the pre-national societies that national historiographies had exiled to the sphere of primitivism and presented their characteristics as inconceivable in theoretical and practical terms for countries that construct their foundation myths on a mono-ethnic, mono-religious and mono-cultural basis. In Turkey in particular, the most rigid and monolithic form of nationalism — *naturalistic primordialism*— prevailed. As the Turkish historian Umut Özkirimli (2013: 95-99) observes, the primordialists believe that nations are ancient and natural entities and that nationality is a "natural" feature, such as speech. One is born into a nation, just as one is born into a family. Every nation has its own place and natural borders, as well as its historical mission and destiny, towards which its members are obliged to work. As is apparent, primordialists do not accept the distinction between nationality and ethnicity (Smith 1995: 31-32). It stands to reason, therefore, that the refugees diverged spectacularly from the definition of Turk or Greek: in the early years, their ethnic identity prevailed over their national identity; they spoke another language, and the language of the eternal enemy no less, while their culture (dress, names, cuisine, music, customs, etc.), even their physical features, deviated from the ethnoracial model, at least as this had been defined by the locals.

The greatest potential danger for the two nation-states, however, was that the refugees were witnesses of the peaceful cohabitation in "mixed" societies, in which there was an established culture of communication and collaboration with other ethnic communities. Nicholas Doumanis calls this culture of coexistence in the late Ottoman period *intercommunality*, which he defines as "accommodation of difference between cultural, ethnic, or religious communities that happened to occupy the same street, neighbourhood, village, or rural environ" (Doumanis 2013a: 1).

Despite the fact that this *belle époque* of ethnic symbiosis was a common place, a *topos* in the narratives of the exchanged former Ottoman refugees, it is today considered more as a romantic, nostalgic memory. Even so, there should be no doubt that *intercommunality* in many ways served the needs and prosperity of the ethnic groups, as it strengthened the sense that together they constituted an organized local

community, the reputation of which should be guarded by all (Doumanis 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Especially in the rural regions of the Ottoman state, the village along with religion and blood ties (kinship) constituted the fundamental components of people's identity (Poulton 1997: 14-15).

Defining the refugee identity in the new homeland: The associations of the exchanged people in Greece and Turkey and relevant cultural foundations and events

In Greece, systematic efforts to preserve, study and promote the history and culture of the "lost homelands" started early on, from the beginning of the 1930s. The refugees, despite the considerable differences among them, comprised over 1/5 of the total population of Greece and for many years formed a distinct element of the Greek society. The sense of injustice that they felt as a result of state policy towards restitution for their property, the negative attitude of the local population towards them, their political exploitation and, above all, the anti-refugee rhetoric of the conservative parties and of a large section of the press (Exertzoglou 2012: 195-201) soon rallied the refugees around a cultural identity that was built upon two pillars: Greekness and the Greek culture of Asia Minor. The study of the history, geography, language, music, literature, visual arts and folklore of Asia Minor Hellenism enabled the composition of a new, long national historical narrative with an inward-looking orientation: it had to show to the local Greeks the long and perpetual continuity of Asia Minor Hellenism from antiquity until today as well as the national purity and cultural merit of the refugees. Moreover, a great debate took place in interwar Greece (1923-1940) on the subject of "Greekness", with the purpose of creating a Modern Greek identity that would no longer be defined politically by the vision of the Great Idea or culturally by the romanticism of European Philhellenism, which was infatuated with antiquity. On the contrary, the Modern Greek identity would have to expand its horizons to historical places and times from which they had been excluded, and integrate the multiple expressions of folk culture. For obvious reasons, the refugees could not be absent from this dialogue in search of Greekness and the new national ideology (Liakos 2011: 11-20; Papanikolaou 2006: 86-89).

The first step was taken by Melpo and Octave Merlier,[2] who founded the *Musical Folklore Archives* in Athens in 1930, with the goal of preserving the musical and folklore traditions of Asia Minor Hellenism. The Archives evolved in 1948 into the *Centre of Asia Minor Studies*, the name with which it still operates today. In addition to its other activities, the Centre documented 5,000 first-generation refugees' accounts (during the period 1930-1975), which are stored in an *Oral Tradition Archive*, classified according to place of origin, and created a corresponding photographic archive. Since then, the Centre has published a series of journals and books. Among the publishing activities of

the refugees, mention must also be made of the journal *Asia Minor Chronicles* of the Union of Smyrneans, which was published in 17 volumes from 1938-1980 (Yannakopoulos 1993).

After the Second World War, and especially from the 1960s, the refugee identity emerged from oblivion. The second generation of refugee families in Greece was considerably active and the refugee experience began to be featured in cinema, literature and music. This phenomenon is clearly not unrelated to the economic migration that took place during this period from the countries of the European south to the industrial north. A large number of the refugees who lived mainly in Macedonia and Thrace were forced to abandon their families' new homeland and migrate abroad, especially to West Germany (Exertzoglou 2011: 194).

The most significant increase in the number of refugee associations took place in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, hundreds of refugee cultural associations, archives and museums were founded throughout Greece.[3] Some of these refugee associations adopted a radical ideology, detaching themselves from the dominant national narrative and setting as their main goal the international recognition of the persecutions of Asia Minor Hellenism as genocide. What they pursued at an initial stage was justice for the memory of the victims and the repentance of the Turkish state. The efforts of these associations, as well as of certain academics and politicians of refugee descent, saw success when the Greek parliament satisfied their demand and established 19 May and 14 September as commemorative anniversaries: the first date marks Kemal Ataturk's disembarkation at Samsun in 1919 (it should be noted that this day is also the greatest national day for the Turkish nation) and the second commemorates the occupation of Smyrna/Izmir by the Turkish army in 1922. These associations exerted great pressure on the Ministry of Education and the political parties, with two goals: either to terminate any revision of the school curricula and history textbooks that question the master narrative and potentially lead to less ethnocentric perspectives, or to increase the number of units on the Asia Minor Catastrophe in the school syllabuses and include the aspect of the genocide (Exertzoglou 2011: 196-200; Athanasiadis 2015: 45-99).

In Turkey, on the other hand, up until the late 20th century, the Turkish refugees and few associations that did exist maintained the same silence on the Population Exchange as did mainstream Turkish historiography. Onur Yildirim underlines that the only details he could find were in publications by Turkish refugee unions, which were funded by the Turkish authorities and consistently stressed the Greek atrocities in Rumeli and Anatolia. These narratives were effectively propaganda and were republished during moments of tension in relations with Greece (Yildirim 2006: 60).

This situation was to change dramatically in Turkey at the dawn of the new century, going from an implicit trauma to a "memory boom" —a term introduced by Jay Winter (2001). A series of events created a particularly favourable climate; the policy of

rapprochement between Greece and Turkey after the military crisis over Imia/Kardak in 1996;[4] Turkey's accession process for membership in the European Union; and the gestures of solidarity between the two peoples during the earthquakes of 1999. Another important factor is the impressive rise in tourism between the two countries, with an emphasis on travel to the refugees' places of origin and direct contact with the current inhabitants, who in their majority are also descendants of refugees. An environment for the emergence of a refugee memory and a reduction or decline in national stereotypes has also been created by the publication of memoirs and literary works and the screening of television series in Turkey and Greece (Lytra 2014: 4; Yildirim 2006: 61; Tsitselikis 2014: 219-220; Millas 2006: 436-437).

The great step forward, in Turkey, was taken in 2000, with the creation of the *Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants* (*Lozan Mubadilleri Vakfi*, LMV).[5] The Foundation aims to embrace all the exchanged refugees and not just the Turkish ones:

> To preserve and regenerate the collective identity and cultural values of the first generation immigrants and their children, […] to create a bridging forum between the separated peoples and promote bilateral meetings, [...] to support friendship and cooperation among Turkish and Greek people, to protect the cultural and historical heritage of both sides, to conduct research on the population exchange, to organize conferences and festivals and to facilitate return visits to the place of origin of peoples on both sides (Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants website 2018).

The LMV has indeed been particularly active since its establishment.[6] It organizes conferences and meetings; it collects oral testimonies from the refugees and their descendants, both Turkish and Greek; and it organizes trips and music events in both countries. In 2010, the *Museum of Population Exchange* (*Mübadele Müzesi*) opened in Çatalca (in the Propontis region) in Turkey. This is an architectural complex comprised of open-air and covered spaces around a building dating from 1913, which has undergone successive uses and reconstructions. The LMV acquired this building and converted it, after its restoration, into a museum in partnership with the Municipality of Çatalca and with the support of the Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture Agency. Nowadays, the exhibits in the Museum are comprised mainly of personal items belonging to the refugees, the majority relating to the peaceful life of coexistence in the places of origin before the war and the Population Exchange: wedding dresses, musical instruments, household items, kitchen utensils, family photographs etc.[7]

In this paper, however, I focus on a particularly interesting bilingual book (in Turkish and Greek) published in 2015 by the LFV with the title "Stories of refugees from the two shores of nostalgia" (Güvenç & Rigas 2015). In this book, 82 narrations by first-, second- and third-generation refugees from both sides of the Aegean are published.

The book was the companion to a travelling exhibition of narratives, photographs, documents and personal items that belonged to refugees, which was presented in nine cities in Turkey and Greece in the period 2013-2015 (Istanbul, Smyrna, Thessaloniki, Mytilene, Edessa, Neapolis in the Kozani region, Ioannina, Thasos and Kavala). The basic idea behind these initiatives is presented in the first lines of the leaflet accompanying the exhibition:

> The exhibition aims at enabling two populations that shared the dramatic experience of compulsory migration to become acquainted with each other and is a contribution to finding a new perspective on history. The common point in the oral accounts of the refugees is the sense of grievance at being born in one country, growing up in another yet feeling a stranger in both (Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants 2015).

Entangled memories and disputed identities

It is clear that the refugees resulting from the Lausanne Convention did not constitute unified ethnic and cultural groups with a common identity and consciousness, and nor did they have the same life experiences. Many refugees on both sides had suffered from the criminal violence of nationalism and were victims of the regular and, especially, irregular military units. They had seen their houses and places of worship on fire, their relatives and neighbours raped and slaughtered. They had lived through the fear and insecurity created by anarchy and lawlessness (Kostopoulos 2007: 91-149; Despotopoulos 1979: 233-247). Other populations, however, were forcibly repatriated without having suffered from abuse or threats. They abandoned their homelands for the sole reason that they happened to believe in a different religion from that established by the Lausanne Convention as the criterion for them to remain. Some refugees were chased out and risked their lives crossing the Aegean, while others left in an orderly fashion under the protection of international agreements. Furthermore, the Population Exchange was a lengthy process, which lasted almost three years, until 1925 (Tsitselikis 2006: 22).

The refugee populations not only had different ethnic origins but also different primary experiences, which shaped what I will analyse below as “refugee trauma”. Nonetheless, as it has been discussed in the previous section, the refugees gradually shaped new identities in their new homelands, both on an individual and a collective level. The consciousness of the refugees was very soon imbued with the ideals of nationalism and the refugee status became an organic part of the relevant national identities.

Perhaps the most illustrative example of the clash of consciousness in the narratives of the Greek and Turkish refugees is over the figure of Ataturk. In the Greek national consciousness, and in particular in that of the refugees, Ataturk is imprinted as the

orchestrator of the Asia Minor Catastrophe, as the individual most responsible for the violent acts committed against the unarmed population, and as the inspiration for nation-cleansing and genocide (Agtzidis 2015: 89-101). On the other side, in the collective consciousness of the Turks, Ataturk is portrayed with messiah-like characteristics, as he is seen as the saviour of the Turkish nation and the architect of the modern Turkish state. It is almost impossible not to find a public or even a private space in Turkey without a statue or photograph of Ataturk or a plaque in his honour. In the consciousness of the Turkish refugees of the Lausanne Convention, Ataturk is something more: he is one of them, a Turk who was forced to abandon his homeland, Thessaloniki in Greece, and fight to create a new homeland. He is the symbol of the refugees, and this is why they invoke his name whenever they encounter rejection by the locals. The incident narrated by a refugee woman with roots in western Macedonia in Greece who settled in Kerasus/Giresun is typical:

> The locals would say, “Where did this lot come from then?” They believed that it was unjust to give property to the refugees. When I was a child, when we played, some children would put us down and call us “stinking refugees”. The adults said this too. “Ataturk is from our homeland. He came before us and saved us…” my mother would reply, which shut them up (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 123).

Even so, despite the obvious and exacerbated differences between the two national refugee populations, the refugee experience had many common points. I will limit myself here to those that are more useful for my specific approach.

First, the violent displacement within a nightmare environment of war and fanaticism was from the first moment a decisive factor in shaping not only their personality and mental world but also their world views and historical consciousness. Many refugees, especially the peasants from the remote areas of the East, were forced to abandon, definitively and irrevocably, not only the land of their birth but also their ways of life and social organisation, which appeared to belong more to what Fernand Braudel called the *longue durée* of history (Braudel 1958). It is very difficult indeed for us today to comprehend the bonds to the land and nature that these people had formed. For this reason, here I prefer the metaphorical term “uprooting”, rather the more descriptively accurate and politically correct terms “displacement”, “expulsion” or “deportation”. This is the reason why, in the imagination of the refugees, the lost place is gradually transformed into an ideal place.

> That, my girl, was the Promised Land. There, as far as the eyes can see, it was all green, there were forests, vines, orchards with many species of fruit trees. Water and vegetation, fertile everywhere, a blessed place. It was truly the Promised Land (Account of Sophia Loukidou, refugee from Halicarnassus /Bodrum in Asia Minor, in Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 251).

Despite the contradictions, distortions and the poisonous effects of propaganda and the education system, the refugees on both sides of the Aegean felt a deep sense of loss and this made it easy for them to empathise with the corresponding loss of the "other" refugees. This process was significantly helped by the practices followed by the committees for the resettlement of the refugees in Greece and Turkey. The refugees who reached the new homeland were settled into the houses of those who had departed; they took their gardens, animals and fields. In many cases the "exchanged" families, the one that arrived and the one that left, lived together in the same house for many months, before the procedure was completed (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 21, 56, 68, 96, 125, 164, 181). Despite the bitterness, the sense of injustice and the nationalist stereotypes, the refugees demonstrated understanding and sympathy for each other. Even decades later, when they began to visit their lost homelands, the inhabitants of their houses opened their doors and welcomed them with respect.

> After 15 days, around 100 refugees came from Turkey. They were hungry and in a wretched condition. We felt sorry for them and shared our bread with them. Four people, Rum from Prussa/Bursa, were settled in our house. They knew Turkish and were good people (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 164).

A second common characteristic shared by the refugees of both sides was the violent and sudden disruption of the social fabric, cultural relations, daily life and customs that are linked to the cycle of life and death. Many refugees appeared never to have overcome the feeling of having abandoned their ancestral graves and could not accept the fact that subsequent generations would be buried in another land, far from their ancestors. The example of the children of a family from Pendic in Turkey who brought earth from Ioannina and Thessaloniki to place on their parents' graves is characteristic (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 242).

This sense of the loss of the natural and social space of the homeland pushed many refugees into roaming around the new country for months and years in community groups in an attempt to find a place that resembled the one they had left behind and that would favour the same productive activities. For example, Muslim refugees from Ioannina settled next to the lake of Pendic (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 112), Cretans from Heraklion in Crete preferred Vourla/Urla on the Aegean coast near Izmir (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 178), while Christians from Agia Kyriaki in Asia Minor ended up settling in Agia Marina in Veria in North Greece, because it "resembled their village" (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 15). In fact, it was a common practice among the refugees in Greece to give to the new city in which they settled the name of the old one, by adding the prefix "Nea" ["New"] to it — e.g. Nea Smyrne.

A third common characteristic in the stories of the refugees on both sides is the traumatic experience of the journey and their reception by the state authorities and,

above all, by the local communities. Most refugees had never travelled before and this was the first time that many of them had seen the sea. With the exception of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Eastern Thrace, who made their way to Greece by taking the land routes, almost all the other refugees were transported by boat. The Muslim refugees, for example, who were transported from the Greek ports of Thessaloniki, Kavala and Preveza were estimated in 1923-1924 to number a total of 268,121 (Yildirim 2006b: 131). The journey took many days, and the conditions on the "coffin boats", as they were called, were deplorable: lack of food and water, lack of hygiene and care, overcrowding. Families were separated, while many infants and elderly people died on the boats and their bodies were thrown overboard. The practice of not burying the dead in the ground was incomprehensible to the refugees and for this reason they attempted to hide their dead children so they could bury them on land (Güvenc & Rigas 2015: 29, 34-35, 51, 97, 263). The similarity that can be observed in all the narratives that discuss this subject is impressive. Similarities appear also in their narratives about wandering around the new place, not as equally dramatic, though. Aside from the struggle for survival, the refugees also had to contend with the loss of their dignity as a consequence of the change in their image. The journey as a whole was a common trauma experience for the refugees.

Within the same framework, a common trauma experience for both the Greek and the Turkish refugees was the enmity and attitude that they encountered from the local populations. In particular, those refugees who spoke the language of the "Other", that is, the Turkish-speaking Christians and the Greek-speaking Muslims, were practically identified with the enemy and were attacked even by other refugees (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 15, 40). In Greece, they were called "Turks", "*tourkosporoi*" (Turkish seeds), "gypsies" and "refugees" (Güvenç & Rigas 2015), and in Turkey "*giaur*" and "dirty refugees" (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 118, 123, 199). The incident narrated by Suraya Aitas, a Greek-speaking first-generation refugee with origins in a Muslim mountain village of Kastoria, is typical. One in four died during the journey from Greece to Turkey in the summer of 1924. When he arrived in Sinasos/Mustafapasa in Turkey along with his mother, his daughter and his fellow villagers, the following incident occurred:

> It was the time for afternoon prayer. They gathered us in the square with the fountain. We looked almost dead from exhaustion. "This is where you will live", they said to us. We didn't know Turkish. Only our imams knew it. The locals brought us food. Tomatoes and watermelons in dishes. We thanked them, but they started shouting "they're giaurs, giaurs". We had no idea what was going on. We only thanked them. But, because we didn't know the language they thought we were infidels (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 98).

Until the 1950s, there were no social relations between the refugees and the locals, there were no mixed marriages. In some cases, they did not even share the same mosque or the same village fountain:

> The locals resisted intermarrying with the refugees for many years, especially if they were to give one of their daughters to them. They drank water from different basins of the same fountain, they did not permit them to pray in the same mosque with the excuse that the mosque would not fit all the refugees and so the refugees were forced to pray in churches that had been converted into mosques. And for years they would not walk in front of their houses (Güvenç & Rigas 2015: 246).

It is apparent that the first-generation refugees in particular were cruelly stigmatized. Also, that the Turkish refugees experienced this exclusion far more severely in comparison with the corresponding Greek ones —at least those who settled in new refugee districts and villages, far from the locals. Let us not forget the different scales. In Greece, the refugees constituted, on the basis of the census of 1928,[8] approximately 19.7% of the total population (1,221,849 out of 6,204,648 inhabitants). In Turkey, in 1927, out of a total population of 13,638,270, the refugees did not exceed 500,000, constituting, that is, just 3.6%.[9] Their cohabitation with the local populations was, therefore, unavoidable and the pressure on them greater, as they settled into an already existing urban fabric.

All the above constitute structural elements that the second-generation Greek refugee from Asia Minor and clinical psychologist Libby Tata-Arcel has called the "Trauma of the Asia Minor Catastrophe" (2014).[10] Tata-Arcel studied this trauma on an individual, family and on a collective level. She has worked on the subject of refugee identity, the coping mechanisms they developed and, above all, on the question of the perception and transformation of the trauma in the subsequent generations of refugee families. The empirical basis for the research was her own family, three generations of women refugees. Let's simply note here that her mother was from Çandarli in Pergamon; she lost close relatives during the persecutions and ended up a refugee in Mytilene. Certain aspects of Tata-Arcel's very interesting and useful study will be used below because they offer us a broad and comprehensive basis for understanding the type of trauma, which encompasses all the refugees of the Population Exchange from both sides.

On an individual level, the trauma experiences of the refugees demolished their psychological identity (Tata-Arsel 2014: 29). The sudden changes in their lives, their inability to predict and organize their daily lives, the loss of loved ones and the breach with their birthplace created a feeling of chaos (Tata-Arsel 2014: 56). Many refugees were unable to overcome this phase and to move on to the phase of adapting to the new reality and to a creative reorganization of their lives. What until then was their natural grief led to a permanent pathological state of emotional paralysis, depression

and despondency. In the condition of refugee trauma, even an individual's cognitive patterns may collapse, that is, everything they had recognized as true and real in the world up till that point (Tata-Arsel 2014: 57). It should also be noted that the traumatized refugees avoided talking about these issues to their children for many years, out of fear perhaps that they would transmit their trauma. For this reason, they kept the traumatic past inside them for a very long time and became trapped in it (Tata-Arsel 2014: 41-42), showing signs of *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder*. When parents recount their trauma experiences to their children, these become "intergenerationally transmitted trauma experiences" (Tata-Arsel 2014: 60-61).

In reality, however, individual and social trauma cannot be separated, at least when the trauma is primary, that is, when it affects the first generation (Tata-Arsel 2014: 27). The family's losses simultaneously traumatize the society to which it belongs. Feelings of trauma, argues Renée Hirschon in a reference to Pierre Bourdieu, are not only individual or momentary, but also collective and diachronic: "they are elements integral to the 'habitus of a group'" (Hirschon 2009: 74). On the level of national societies, such as the Greek, the refugee trauma of the Asia Minor Catastrophe became a national trauma and, subsequently, a cultural trauma. It is shaped, preserved and evolved through commemorative practices, such as anniversary commemorations, memorial events, publications, radio and television programmes, dedications in newspapers and museums, etc. (Tata Arsel 2014: 65). The collective process of *working through* the trauma, in keeping with the way in which it is done and what its goals are, can lead to hatred for the Other, especially if a nationalist and populist discourse prevails, to healing, catharsis and an exit from the cycle of revenge and retribution and, to reconciliation (Tata-Arsel 2014: 46 & 70).

Can there be a shared *lieu de mémoire* for the refugees of the Population Exchange?

The question as to whether there can be a lieu de mémoire (site of memory) common to all the refugees of the Population Exchange is not as simple as it sounds, nor is it understood in the same way by everyone. The most realistic answer is obviously negative. Since there is no common refugee memory and identity, and since one cannot exist, then how can there be a shared site of memory?

It was made clear above that, despite the common characteristics of the refugee experience, there are many factors that make the homogenization of the refugee memory impossible: the multiethnicity of the refugee groups, their cultural multiplicity, the diverse nature of their trauma experiences, the filtering of these experiences through nationalist dogma and, above all, their consecutive re-significations through national and ethnic stereotypes.

However, it would be equally dangerous and unethical to respond in a wholly positive way to the above question; to agree, for example, that for the sake of a common Greek-Turkish memory we must silence or downplay all the 'sensitive' or 'controversial' subjects; in other words, to construct a narrative that instrumentalizes history, as nationalist narratives do, although this time with the intention to promote peace and friendship between the two peoples.

Before we negotiate this critical question from a different perspective, it would be useful to remind ourselves of how Pierre Nora defines the meaning of a lieu de mémoire. The lieu de mémoire, he argues, is the product of the interaction between memory and history. A site of memory cannot exist without will and remembering, but also without the contribution of historical research. Today, memory appears everywhere. Individuals and groups feel the need to discover their past, to communicate with it, to integrate it into their identity, and to symbolize it by creating sites of memory. On the other hand, historians, having abandoned the one-dimensional history that served nationalism and constructed nation state-memory, have turned to the study of indirect sources, those sources for which there was no intention of preserving. Indeed those sources focused on aspects of the past that until today had been closed off. A site of memory, Nora underlines, can be absolutely anything as long as it has three features: material, functional and symbolic (Nora 1989: 18-19).

Within such a theoretical framework, what could be the lieu de mémoire of the exchanged refugees? The lost homeland, namely the place of origin? The peaceful life and cultural coexistence of the pre-national societies of the past? Nostalgic reminiscence about the pre-trauma life of the ancestors? The idyllic space of a lost Arcadia that only the poetic imagination can resurrect?

Or should the site of memory be the scenery of violence and war? A space that monumentalizes the pain and horror that revives and reminds the trauma that empathetically transmits the despair, hopelessness and grief of the experiences of the refugee ancestors? Will it paint a martyrological iconography of heroes —no longer of the nation, but of the family, the community, the mass of silent and defenceless victims of a diplomatic agreement inconceivable to common sense?

Or, finally, should this site of memory be the place of destination and relocation of the refugees, the new homeland, so that it can refer to the post-trauma era of creativity, to the greatness of the spirit of the persecuted, to their contribution to the development of the new state, the enrichment of the culture of the new homeland? Moreover, should it include their social integration, the collective management of the refugee heritage, and, hence, should it extend to the later generations?

My view is that, just as there is no unified refugee memory and identity, neither should a shared site of refugee memory be created that would exclude any aspect of the above.

In Greece at least, there are many sites of memory for the refugees, which are enclosed and self-referential and function by exclusion. What is truly missing today from the culture of memory of not only the Greek but also the Turkish people is a site of memory that can accommodate all aspects of refugee memory without excluding anything: nostalgia, trauma, national, family, social elements, etc. We do not need a common narrative with consecrated protagonists and denationalized refugees. On the contrary, we need a lieu de mémoire that will at the same time display and generate narratives that are comparable but also different, converging as well as conflicting, and which will provoke multiple interpretations and perspectives: a site of memory that will encourage reflection and a dialogue with the past and about the past.[11]

If a shared lieu de mémoire could exist for the refugees of the Population Exchange, then wherever it would be established and whatever form it would take (local, inter-local or supra-local, material or virtual), then this site must be multi-mnemonic. The only type of memory that this monumental place should not exhibit but instead generate is that which Tzvetan Todorov (2002: 220-221) has called paradigmatic memory: a memory that will utilize the parallels in traumatic events, will be imbued by ethical values and will have a pedagogic orientation. This memory, therefore, will be liberating and ecumenical.

This site of memory must also be a space for History Education and be integrated into what has come to be known internationally by the term Peace Education (McCully 2010; Besseling, Coulardeau, Schweitzer & Villanueva 2014).

At this point, an important clarification must be made on the relationship between history education and both peace and reconciliation. Peace Education does not mean silencing or downplaying violence and conflict, ignoring the prejudices that produce hatred, hiding collective traumas, or erasing disputed and painful historical issues from the teaching of history; just as reconciliation does not mean adopting the same views or forgetting (Cole 2007: 1-7). On the contrary, it means the building of new relations between citizens, families, schools, communities, societies and peoples who in the past have been trapped in a vicious cycle of blood. In other words, the building of a post-conflict historical consciousness is a precondition for the creation of deeply rooted attitudes that have the concepts of peace and reconciliation at their core. Today, both history and museum education have at their disposal a rich toolbox of teaching methods through which they can effectively serve these objectives.

The question of the creation of a lieu de mémoire for the Greek and Turkish refugees of the Convention of Lausanne is exceptionally complex. For the creation of a lieu de mémoire for the Greek and Turkish refugees of the Convention of Lausanne we need to provoke a conversation in which people from both sides of the Aegean can participate; and not only specialists (historians, museologists, anthropologists, educators, sociologists and psychologists), but also the refugee associations, citizens and

politicians with a particular interest in the subject. In any case, the subject exceeds the disciplinary or interdisciplinary boundaries of the academic debate and extends into the sphere of public history. Despite the worrying political developments in Turkey and the rise of nationalism in Europe, the present time is an appropriate one for opening this discussion: the Aegean has again become a "sea of refugees"; the two countries are filled with refugees fleeing war; while many of the refugee associations of the Population Exchange are actively participating in providing relief to those suffering and are campaigning to raise awareness among the general population by referring to the analogous traumatic experiences of their ancestors.

According to my opinion, if we accept as the basis of the discussion Nora's tripartite signification of the meaning of the lieu de mémoire (material, symbolic, functional) as well as the disadvantage of having it established in only one country, either Greece or Turkey, then the common lieu de mémoire could be a common digital space managed by Greeks and Turks, which will host refugee testimonies, exhibit objects, contain links to refugee associations, research foundations and give information about their activities, and provide educational material, programmes, etc. Otherwise, we could have two twin lieux de mémoire, for example a museum in Greece and a museum in Turkey, which, despite the differences in their statutes, will be founded upon the same general, historical, social and museological principles, and will be open to other refugee identities and experiences. In brief, these lieux de mémoire should —through the multi-functionality of the refugee testimonies and their material exhibits— create a historical educational environment that will stimulate and foster communication between different peoples, between the past and the present, cultivate historical awareness, and strengthen the understanding of the present through an acute historical perspective.

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Notes

[1] The most detailed paper on the status of the Population Exchange in Greek and Turkish national historiography is that of Yildirim (2006: 47-63). On the image of Greeks and Turks in the school textbooks and the historiography of the "Other", see Millas 2001.

[2] Oktave Merlier (1897-1976) was a French philhellenic philologist and scholar, director for many years of the French Institute in Athens with remarkable work and social action in Greece and France; his wife Melpo Logotheti-Merlier (1890-1979) descended from Xanthi and Constantinople and was a Greek musicologist and folklorist. Both created a valuable archive with data collected in Asia Minor and Greece.

[3] See the related websites www.mikrasiatis.gr/syllogoi and www.pontos-news.gr (retrieved 30/8/ 2016).

[4] Imia (in Greek) or Kardak (in Turkish) are two of the hundreds of rocky islets in the eastern Aegean, which the Turkish state describes as "grey zones" of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947). Turkey considers their status to be in question, if not Turkish. The incident that broke out in January 1996, caused by local Greek activists and Turkish journalists with the removal and raising of flags on the island, resulted in the deployment of the Turkish and Greek fleets to the islands. The two forces came very close to a military conflict, which was avoided after the intervention of NATO and the USA.

[5] http://www.lozanmubadilleri.org.tr (retrieved 14/1/2018).

[6] See the Foundation's website: http://www.lozanmubadilleri.org.tr (retrieved 14.1.2018).

[7] http://www.lozanmubadilleri.org.tr/catalca-mubadele-muzesi (retrieved 14/1/2018). I will not focus here on the Population Exchange Museum in Çatalca, as I was unable to visit it in the summer of 2016. I hope, however, to return soon in order to study it and present the results in a further publication.

[8] The accuracy of the rates is not certain, although the census was conducted a few years after the crucial period of 1922-1925.

[9] See http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11 [retrieved 29/8/2016).

[10] On trauma and its relationship to memory and historical thinking, see Ricoeur 2013: 119-137; Kokkinos 2015: 214-230. The introduction by D. Mavroskoufis, pp. 13-29, is also especially enlightening. See also Kokkinos & Mavroskoufis 2015.

[11] In this context, contemporary academic debate and research on the relationship between Oral History and History Education (formal and non-formal) is proved very helpful. On the role and position of oral history in museums and history education, see Nakou 2005; Boumpari 2016; Nakou & Gazi, 2016. On how to deal with controversial issues in History teaching in divided societies and specifically in Northern Ireland, see McCully & Montgomery 2009.